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CONSENT FOR AMICUS FILING 
The Utah Medical Association ("UMA") currently represents approximately 3,100 
physician members throughout the State of Utah. Approximately 50 percent of these 
physicians routinely enter into arbitration agreements with their patients. Many more 
physicians are contemplating the routine use of such agreements. UMA physicians are 
currently parties in wrongful death lawsuits brought by the heirs of deceased patients. It is 
unfortunate, but inevitable, that such cases will continue to be filed against UMA 
physicians in the future, and that arbitration agreements will be at issue. Many UMA 
physicians will thus be directly impacted by this Court's ruling in this appeal regarding the 
enforceability of a physician-patient arbitration agreement against a deceased patient's heirs 
for claims of wrongful death. 
Accordingly as UMA has a significant interest in the outcome of the Court's ruling 
in this appeal, all parties, appellants Gregory P. Stevens, M.D., Richard M. Rosenthal, 
M.D., and IHC Health Center-Holladay, and Appellee Christine Baker, personal 
representative of the estate of Gary Baker, have consented to the appearance of the UMA 
as amicus curiae as required by Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A 
Stipulation Consenting to the Filing of Amicus Brief by the Utah Medical Association was 
filed with this Court on February 13, 2004. A copy of this Stipulation is attached as 
Addendum A. 
1 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The UMA hereby adopts and incorporates the Statement of Jurisdiction, Statement 
of Issues and Standard of Review set forth in the briefs of Appellants. 
IMPORTANT STATUTES 
The determination regarding the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in a 
medical malpractice action is governed in part by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 (2002), and the Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-31a-l through 20 (2002). Copies of these statutes are attached at Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Utah Medical Association adopts and incorporates the Statement of the Case set 
forth in the briefs of Appellants. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in finding "that plaintiffs wrongful death action is separate 
and distinct from the cause of action the deceased would have had for personal injuries had 
he survived," (R. at 84-95), and in refusing to enforce the Arbitration Agreement against 
the decedent's heirs. Under well-established Utah law, a wrongful death action is not 
entirely separate and distinct from the cause of action the deceased would have had for the 
personal injuries had he survived. The wrongful death cause of action is based on the 
2 
underlying wrong done to the decedent, and is subject to defenses that could have been 
asserted against the decedent, which includes enforcement of an Arbitration Agreement. 
Public policy favoring arbitration is well settled in Utah and throughout the United 
Statds. Failure to enforce the Arbitration Agreement in this case would adversely impact 
Utah physicians and their patients, contrary to public policy and state law. All existing 
physician-patient arbitration agreements in Utah with similar language would be rendered 
void as to wrongful death claims, fiTistrating the intent of the parties. It would arbitrarily 
limit arbitration in medical negligence exclusively to cases where the heirs cannot assert a 
claim. This would defeat well-established Utah arbitration law, which has been 
systematically developed to allow arbitration in the physician-patient context for all claims 
arising from medical care rendered. 
If arbitration agreements were held unenforceable against heirs for claims of 
wrongful death, then they cannot be enforced against heirs for loss of consortium. The 
net effect would be to deprive parties of the right to contract for meaningful arbitration. 
It would, additionally, create the potential for anomalous results, as heirs could litigate 
their claims for loss of consortium, while the patient must arbitrate his/her medical 
negligence claim, on identical facts. 
The policy reasons requiring the non-signing heirs to be bound by an arbitration 
agreement are far more convincing than any arguments to avoid enforcement of that 
agreement. Enforcement it is not only consistent with the Utah Arbitration statutes, but is 
essential to further the goals of that legislation and the judicially declared preference in 
favor arbitration, whether in the context of medical care, or other areas in which 
individuals enter into service contracts. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH HAS SYSTEMATICALLY ADOPTED ARBITRATION AS A 
SOUND AND FAVORED REMEDY THAT IS PROPERLY USED IN 
THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT CONTEXT. 
American courts, historically, refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate on the 
ground that such agreements ousted the courts from their jurisdiction. Stephen P. Bedell, 
Lolla Harrison and Brian Grant, Arbitrabilitv: Current Developments in the Interpretation 
and Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements. 13 J. Contemp. L. 1, 1-2 (1987). To 
remedy this anachronism, Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act of 1924. 
Id. The purpose of the Arbitration Act was to place arbitration agreements "upon the 
same footing as other contracts, where they belong . . . ." Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. 
Bvrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Scss. 1-2 
(1924)). With the passage of the Arbitration Act, Congress established "a strong federal 
policy favoring arbitration.55 Harrison & Grant, supra, at 1-2; accord Shearson/American 
Exp., Inc. v. McMahoq 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (federal policy favors arbitration). In effect, 
"the Arbitration Act simply codifi[ed] the common law duty of courts to enforce the terms 
of valid contracts, and was necessitated only by the traditional reluctance of courts to 
enforce arbitration clauses.55 Harris & Grant, supra, at 1-2. 
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Numerous commentators have concluded that individuals fare at least as well in 
arbitration than court, if not better. See Leis L. Maltby, Private Tustice: Employment 
Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 29, 54-55 (1998). Indeed, 
many consider arbitration as the ideal forum in which to decide legal disputes concerning 
healthcare. Keith Maurer, "Medical Justice Through Alternative Dispute Resolution,35 
National Arbitration Forum (2002)<http://w\\^v.arb-foram.com/articles/html>; Ann H. 
Nevers, Medical Malpractice Arbitration in the New Millennium: Much Ado About 
Nothing?. 1 Pepp. Disp. Resol. LJ. 45, 89 (2000). A 1992 General Accounting Office 
study of medical malpractice litigation found it took 33 months to resolve a medical 
malpractice claim through the court, while arbitration took nineteen months. Medical 
Malpractice: Alternatives to Litigation, United States General Accounting Office Report to 
Congress, 9 (January, 1992). The study further found plaintiffs in litigation won about 33 
percent of their cases, while plaintiffs in arbitration won 52 percent of their cases. I<1 
Consumer Reports magazine has observed, "Arbitration can help consumers settle their 
disputes faster and cheaper than by litigation.33 Consumer Reports, August 1999, p. 64. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that courts must compel arbitration 
when a valid arbitration agreement exists. See e ^ , Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Southland Corp. v. Keating. 465 U.S. 2 
(1984); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 
513 U.S. 265 (1995); Doctor's Assoc. Inc. v. Cassarotto. 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
Virtually every state has, moreover, articulated a strong policy in favor of arbitration.1 
Utah law comports with its federal and state counterparts in striving to enforce 
arbitration agreements. In 1927 the Utah Legislature enacted the Uniform Arbitration 
Act, which mandated enforcement of arbitration agreements. 1927 Utah Laws 62. 
Originally the Act applied only to the arbitration of existing controversies and did not 
cover agreements to arbitrate future disputes. Allred v. Educators Mutual Ins. Ass'n of 
Utah. 909 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1996). However, in 1977 the Utah Legislature 
amended the Act to include the arbitration of future disputes. Utah Code. Ann. 
-'See e.g., Bureau of Special Investigations v. Coalition of Public Safety. 722 N.E.2d 
441 (Mass. 2000) (strong public policy favoring arbitration); Vandenberg v. Superior 
Court. 982 P.2d 229 (Cal. 1999) (same); Martin v. Vance. 514 S.E.2d 306 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1999) (same); Thujiderstick Lodge. Inc. v. Reuer. 585 N.W2d 819 (S.D. 1998) 
(arbitration favored); Northwester Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Stinnett. 698 N.E.2d 339 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1998) (strong public policy favoring arbitration); Perez v. Mid-Century Ins. Co.. 
934 P.2d 732 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (same); Anthony v Kaplan. 918 S.W2d 174 (Ark. 
1996) (same); Prudential Securities Inc. v. Marshall. 909 S.W2d 896 (Tex. 1995) 
(arbitration of disputes is strongly favored under federal and state law); White v. 
Kampner. 642 A.2d 1381 (Conn. 1994) (arbitration favored); Graham v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 565 A.2d 908 (Del. 1989) (same); Roe v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co.. 533 
So.2d 279 (Fla. 1988) (same); Dairvland Ins. Co. v. Rose. 591 P.2d 281 (N.M. 1979) 
(strong preference for resolution by arbitration); Modern Const.. Inc. v. Barce. Inc., 556 
P.2d 528 (AJaska 1976) (strong public policy favors arbitration); Grover-Diamond Assoc, 
v. American Arbitration Ass'n. 211 N.W2d 787 (Minn. 1973) (same); Tensen v. Arrow 
Ins. Co.. 494 P.2d 1334 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (public policy of Arizona favors 
arbitration); Dominion Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Hart. 498 P2d 1138 (Colo. 1972) (arbitration is 
favored). 
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§ 78-31-1 (1977). "Thus Utah law has favored arbitration provisions covering future 
disputes since 1977." AllredL 909 P.2d at 1265. 
In 1996 this Court made clear that arbitration agreements are valid and enforceable 
in the physician-patient context, stating: 
We emphasis preliminarily that arbitration agreements are 
favored in Utah and that no public policy requires such 
agreements to be subject to a different analysis when they are 
between physicians and patients. They are enforceable if they 
meet the standards applicable to all contracts. 
Sosa v. Paulos. 924 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1996). The Legislature codified this as a 
favored public policy in 1999 by amending the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act to 
specify the terms of enforceable physician-patient arbitration agreements. Utah Code .Ann. 
§ 78-14-17 (1999). In 2003 the Legislature further developed Utah arbitration law in the 
medical negligence context, amending the statute to authorize a health care provider to 
refuse care to a patient who does not agree to arbitration. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 
(Supp. 2003). 
The Utah Legislature additionally revised the Utah Arbitration Act, effective May 
2003, "to be more comprehensive and to (1) codify existing case law interpreting 
arbitration statutes, (2) resolve ambiguities inherent within the statutes, and (3) modernize 
arbitration practice and procedure.33 Kent B. Scott and James B. Belshe, Utah's Revised 
Uniform Arbitration Act: A Makeover for the Face of Arbitration, 16 Dec. Utah B. J. 26, 
7 
27 (Dec. 2003). The Act makes clear arbitration agreements are valid and enforceable 
under Utah law, and that parties can agree to arbitrate any controversy. It provides: 
An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration 
any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the 
parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable 
except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the 
revocation of a contract. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-107(l) (2002). Thus, if a party "show[s] an agreement to 
arbitrate," the court "shall . . . order the parties to arbitrate.35 Id at § 78-31a-108(l). 
It is well-established that "the goal of the Act is to encourage extra-judicial 
settlement of legal disputes.35 Pacific Development. L.C. v. Orton, 2001 UT 36, 11 12, 23 
P.3d 1035. "The [Utah Arbitration] Act supports arbitration of both present and future 
disputes and reflects long-standing public policy favoring speedy and inexpensive methods 
of adjudicating disputes. . . .55 AIlred? 909 P.2d at 1265; accord McCoy v. Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield of Utah, 2001 UT 31, 11 14, 20 P.3d 901; Sosa, 924 P2d at 359; Buzas 
Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P2d 941, 946 (Utah 1996); DeVore v. 
IHC Hospitals. Inc., 884 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah 1994). This Court has long affirmed 
"the strong public policy in favor of arbitration as an approved, practical and inexpensive 
means of settling disputes and easing court congestion.55 Robinson & Wells v. Warren, 
669 P2d 844, 846 (Utah 1983). 
Arbitration "is a remedy freely bargained for by the parties.55 Lindon City v. 
Engineers Constr. Co.. 636 P2d 1070, 1073 (Utah 1981). It is the policy of the law in 
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Utah to interpret contracts in favor of arbitration, "in keeping with [the] policy of 
encouraging extrajudicial resolution of disputes when the parties have agreed not to 
litigate.33 Central Fla. Inv.. Inc. v. Parkwest Assoc. 2002 UT 3, 11 16, 40 P.3d 599. 
Arbitration clauses should be liberally interpreted when the 
issue contested is the scope of the clause. If the scope of an 
arbitration clause is debatable or reasonably in doubt, the 
clause should be construed in favor of arbitration unless it can 
be said that it is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers 
the asserted dispute. 
Lindon, 636 P.2d at 1073 (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has a well-established history in defining a public policy 
that liberally encourages the broad enforcement of extrajudicial dispute resolution 
agreements that have been voluntarily entered into. See e.g.. Central Florida. 2002 UT 3, 
11 16; Buzas Baseball. 925 P2d at 946; Allred. 90 P.2d at 1265; Intermountain Power 
Agency v. Union Pacific R.R Co.. 961 P2d 320, 325 (Utah 1988); Docutel Olivetti 
Corp. v. Dick Bradv Systems. Inc.. 731 P2d 475, 479-480 (Utah 1986); Lindon. 636 
P.2d at 1073. 
II. UTAH LAW REQUIRES ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENT AGAINST THE ESTATE AND HEIRS. 
In the present case, the plain language of the Arbitration Agreement demonstrates 
the parties expressly contracted to submit to arbitration any dispute as to medical 
negligence arising out of the care provide by the physician, whether it is asserted by the 
patient or his heirs. The Agreement provides: 
We expressly intend that this Agreement shall bind all persons 
whose claims for injuries and losses arise out of medical care 
rendered or which should have been rendered by Physician 
after the date of this Agreement, including any spouse or heirs 
of the patient and any children, whether born or unborn at the 
time of the occurrence giving rise to any claim. 
(Arbitration Agreement Art. 1) (emphasis added) (copy attached as Addendum C). 
The Agreement specifically applies to wrongful death claims: 
All claims for monetary damages against the physician . . . . 
must be arbitrated including, without limitation, claims for 
personal injury loss of consortium, wrongful death, emotional 
distress or punitive damages. 
(Id.) (Emphasis added). 
The plaintiff/appellee does not dispute that the Arbitration Agreement is a valid 
enforceable agreement and that it would have been enforceable against Mr. Baker had he 
survived. The question before this Court is whether the terms of this Arbitration 
Agreement can be enforced against Mr. Baker's heirs since they were not parties to the 
Agreement. The trial court ruled it cannot, finding "that plaintiffs wrongful death action 
is separate and distinct from the cause of action the deceased would have had for personal 
injuries had he survived." (R. at 84-95.) Not only does the court's ruling ignore public 
policy favoring arbitration, but it is expressly premised on a misinterpretation of Utah law. 
Although Utah courts recognize that "an action for wrongful death is an 
independent action accruing in the heirs of the deceased," Utah courts have "not entirely 
separated the heirs' right from the decedent's because the heirs' right is in major part based 
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on the rights of support, both financial and emotional, that run to them from the 
deceased.35 Tensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc.. 944 P.2d 327, 332 (Utah 1997). In Tensen 
this Court stated: 
We have held that the wrongful death cause of action is based 
on the underlying wrong done to the decedent and may only 
proceed subject to at least some of the defenses that would 
have been available against the decedent had she lived to 
maintain her own action. 
Id at 332 (emphasis added).2 
Thus, based on this authority, a Utah wrongful death action is not entirely 
independent from the cause of action the deceased would have had for the personal 
injuries had he survived. Rather, "the wrongful death cause of action is based on the 
underlying wrong done to the decedent." I<± The instant wrongful death cause of action 
^The Utah wrongful death statute has been interpreted by the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals to preclude suit by heirs where a deceased person could not have maintained such 
suit. The Tenth Circuit explained the principle as follows: 
[E]ven though it is a separate and distinct action which arises 
on the death of the decedent, the foundation of the right of 
action is the original wrongful injury to the decedent. And it 
is essential to the maintenance of the action that the wrongful 
act or default be of such character that the decedent could 
have maintained an action to recover damages for his injury if 
death had not ensured. While it is not a derivative action in 
the ordinary meaning of the term, recovery cannot be had 
unless the decedent could have recovered damages for his 
wrongful injury had he survived. . . . 
Francis v. Southern Pac. Co.. 162 E2d 813 (10th Cir. 1947), affd 333 U.S. 445 (1948). 
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is thus necessarily predicated on the decedent's medical care, and the relationship entered 
into by the patient and the physician. 
The wrongful death cause of action is, moreover, subject to defenses that could 
have been asserted against the deceased. Id The following are examples of defenses that 
Utah courts have recognized against a decedent's heirs: 1) heirs are bound by a 
comparative negligence defense to the extent it would be enforceable against the deceased 
and any causes of action the deceased could have brought, Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 
784 P.2d 1152, 1155 (Utah 1998); 2) heirs are bound by the Utah Workers5 
Compensation Act as to claims against the deceased's employer, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-2-105 (1997); and 3) heirs are bound by a statute of limitations defense 
enforceable against the deceased and any causes of action the deceased could have brought. 
Jensen, 944 P.2d at 332. 
Had the decedent survived and sued for the alleged medical negligence at issue in 
this case, the Arbitration Agreement would clearly be binding against him to terminate 
litigation and compel arbitration. Where, as here, a patient expressly contracts to submit 
to arbitration any dispute as to medical malpractice, it must be deemed to apply to all 
medical negligence claims arising out of the care provided, whether they are asserted by 
the patient or a third party. 
The case of Tensen v. IHC Hospitals. Inc.. 944 P.2d 327, 332 (Utah 1997), 
mandates this result. In Jensen, this Court held that heirs could not maintain a wrongful 
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death suit where the "injured patient . . . chose to let the statute of limitations run on the 
underlying personal injury claim5' prior to her death. Id, at 332-333. In such a situation, 
the heirs3 wrongful death claims are barred by the statute of limitations." Id. at 332-333. 
The Tensen Court declined to separate the death from the causative wrong to 
permit a wrongful death action, where the decedent's personal injury cause of action was 
barred at the time of death, stating: 
"The injured individual is not merely a conduit for the support 
of others, he is master of his own claim and he may settle the 
case or win or lose a judgment on his own injury even though 
others may be dependent upon him." 
Tensen, 944 P2d at 322 (emphasis added) (quoting W Page Keeton et al., Prosser and 
Keeton on the Law of Torts § 127, at 955 (5th ed. 1984)). This Court recognized "[t]he 
majority of states refuse[] to allow a decedent's heirs to proceed with a wrongful death suit 
after the decedent has settled his or her personal injury case or won or lost a judgment 
before dying." Tensen, 944 P.2d at 332-333. 
Under Tensen, as "master of his own claim," a patient can completely cut off the 
potential wrongful death claims of his heirs by not initiating a lawsuit prior to the 
expiration of the statute of limitations, either accidentally or intentionally The heirs' 
wrongful death claim is not so separate and independent as to allow them a separate 
statute of limitations; rather, they are bound to the limitations period applicable to the 
patient and to the patient's relating course of conduct prior to death. 
If the Arbitration Agreement this case were not enforced against the heirs of the 
deceased patient, then under Tensen, a patient could completely cut of his heirs from 
asserting a claim for wrongful death by mere inaction, yet that same a patient could not 
intentionally agree to the forum for resolution by entering into an arbitration agreement. 
Such a result is not only anomalous, but graces heirs with broader options for recourse 
relating to medical care provided to the patient than the patient himself would have had. 
Cases with similar facts from other jurisdictions have enforced arbitration 
agreements against heirs in wrongful death claims. In Allen v. Pacheax 71 P.3d 375 
(Colo. 2003) (en banc), cert, denied, 2004 WL 324431 (U.S. 2004), for example, a 
surviving wife filed a wrongful death claim alleging negligence by her husband's health 
care providers. The providers sought to submit the claim to binding arbitration pursuant 
to an arbitration provision between the husband and his HMO. Applying contract 
constraction principles, the Colorado Supreme Court examined the arbitration agreement 
and determined that the language plainly applied to "any claim of medical malpractice,53 
which included the wife's claim for wrongful death, even though she did not sign the 
arbitration agreement. Ici at 378-379. 
The Allien court stated: "We hold that the arbitration agreement does apply to 
non-party spouses because . . . a non-party may be bound by the terms of an agreement if 
the parties so intend . . . ." Id at 379 (emphasis added). It explained: 
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Although it is true that a wrongful death claim is separate and 
distinct from a cause of action the deceased couJd have 
maintained had he survived, this observation is not helpful in 
determining whether separate wrongful death claims are in fact 
included within the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
agreement. Because the plain language of the agreement in 
this case refers to "all claims53 including those brought for 
"death," and because we must apply a strong presumption in 
favor of arbitration, we find that the arbitration agreement 
applies to wrongful death claims. 
Id at 379-380 (emphasis added).3 
Likewise, in Ballard v. Southwest Detroit Hospital 327 N.W2d 370 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1982), the Michigan Court of Appeals held an arbitration agreement executed by a 
deceased patient was binding upon the personal representative. The Ballard court stated: 
Any substantive impediment that would have prevented the 
decedent from commencing suit will likewise preclude suit by 
the personal representative. For example, where the decedent's 
death is the result of an injury arising out of the course of his 
employment, the estate is bound, as the decedent would have 
been, to the exclusive remedy provision of the worker's 
compensation act, and the personal representative will be 
prevented from maintaining a separate wrongful death action. 
Id at 371. 
Arbitration agreements are, moreover, routinely enforced against non-signing heirs 
in other contexts. In lansen v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 776 A.2d 816 (N.J. Super. 
App. Div. 2001), for example, beneficiaries of retirement accounts brought a negligence 
^The Allen court went on to determine, however, that the arbitration agreement at 
issue in that case was unenforceable because it failed to comply with the requirements of 
the Colorado Health Care Availability Act. Allen, 71 P.3d at 384. 
action against their father's financial advisors. The New Jersey Superior Court held that 
the beneficiaries3 claim arose out of the father's agreement, and thus they were bound by 
the arbitration clause. The Tansen court explained: 
Arbitrability of a particular claim "depends not upon the 
characterization of the claim, but upon the relationship of the 
claim to the subject matter of the arbitration clause.53 
Id. at 258 (quoting Wasserstein v. Kovatch, 618 A.2d 886, 286 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 
1993)). 
Similarly in Smith, Barney Inc. v. Henry, 775 So.2d 722 (Miss. 2001), the 
Mississippi Supreme Court determined that the heirs to financial accounts could be 
compelled to arbitrate tlieir claims relating to negligent management of the funds. In that 
case, the decedent left in trust to her daughter two financial accounts overseen by Smith 
Barney. Id at 723. After the funds in both accounts were wrongfully transferred to 
another party, the daughter sued Smith Barney for breach of fiduciary duty to the estate 
and negligent conversion of the funds. Id at 724. 
Smith Barney sought to compel arbitration, and the Mississippi Supreme Court 
determined that the all of the beneficiary's claims arose out of or related to the decedent's 
accounts. In reaching this conclusion, the Smith Barney court emphasized that because 
the "funds which [were] the subject of [the beneficiary's] claims were derived directly from 
[the decedent's] accounts and transactions with smith Barney,35 the arbitration provision 
was binding. Id at 726. The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that she was a 
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non-signatory to the agreement and an unintended third-party beneficiary. The court held 
that the express terms of the decedent's will named the plaintiff a successor to the 
decedent's rights and thus subjected her to arbitration. Id at 727. 
Additionally in Collins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 561 So.2d 
952 (La. Ct. App. 1990), the Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial 
of a motion to compel arbitration, and held non-signatory heirs and successors were 
bound by a decedent's arbitration agreement with a brokerage firm, where the agreement 
expressly bound successors and assigns. IcL at 955. The Collins court held the defendants 
were entitled to arbitration because "the Customer Agreement on its face applies to all 
accounts of a customer, whether CMA's or otherwise, and clearly requires arbitration of all 
disputes arising out of the customer's business with Merrill Lynch." IcL 
Similar results have been reached in other contexts. See, e.g., American Bureau of 
Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard, 170 F.3d 349, 352 (2d Cir. 1999) (non-signatory insurance 
underwriter compelled to arbitrate); Seborowski v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 188 F.3d 163, 
168 (3d Cir. 1999) (non-signatory beneficiaries of deceased employees compelled to 
arbitrate claims alleging breach of collective bargaining agreement signed by deceased 
employees); In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 659 F.2d 789, 795-96 (7th Cir. 1981) 
(non-signatory transport company subject to arbitration as an agent of plaintiff). 
These cases demonstrate both the broad acceptance of fundamental law favoring 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement against non-signatories where claims are based on 
the relationship subject to the agreement, and the potential that this Court's ruling will 
significantly impact contractual rights and claims beyond the healthcare arena. Arbitration 
agreements are commonplace in uniform real estate contracts, design and construction 
contracts, brokerage account agreements, and mortgage agreements. 
This Court has "repeatedly held that competent parties are free to bargain for any 
term that does not require a violation of the law." Salt Lake County v. Western Dairymen 
Co-op., Inc., 2002 UT 39, 11 18, 48 P.3d 910; accord Phone Directories Co. v. 
Henderson, 2000 UT 64, 11 15, 8 P.3d 256. The patient should be able to determine by 
contract the forum where medical care provided to him will be addressed. Decedents are 
able to bind their heirs through other contracts, wills and testamentary dispositions, so the 
concept is neither new or illogical. It is, moreover, the policy adopted by most federal and 
state law across the country. 
III. FAILURE TO ENFORCE THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IN THIS 
CASE WILL ADVERSELY IMPACT UTAH PHYSICIANS AND THEIR 
PATIENTS, EVISCERATING ESTABLISHED UTAH ARBITRATION 
LAW. 
If this Court were to hold the Arbitration Agreement unenforceable against the 
decedent's heirs5 claim for wrongful death, all existing physician-patient agreements in 
Utah with similar language would be rendered void as to wrongful death claims. This 
would frustrate the intent of the parties to these agreements, which is to arbitrate all claims 
arising out of the health care provided, including claims by heirs for wrongful death. 
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Such a ruling would, moreover, limit arbitration in medical negligence exclusively 
to cases where the heirs cannot assert a claim. This scenario would defeat well-established 
and carefully developed Utah arbitration law. Wrongful death claims are filed by heirs in 
cases arising from virtually every specialty of medical care. To exclude wrongful death 
claims from arbitration agreements would leave a gaping whole in every arbitration 
agreement, regardless of the patient's wishes. 
Under the trial court's ruling, the only way to create an enforceable arbitration 
agreement covering all claims arising out of medical care provided, including claims for 
wrongful death, would be for spouses and all potential heirs to join in the execution of the 
arbitration agreement. It is unrealistic to require the signatures of all the heirs to bind 
them to an arbitration agreement, particularly since they may not even be identified until 
the time of death. 
Requiring heirs to participate in the creation of the arbitration agreement in older 
to encompass claims of wrongful death would have the equally troublesome effect of 
requiring disclosure of confidential medical treatment, and even worse, requiring the heirs5 
concurrence in the treatment. This approach would authorize an intrusion into a patient's 
confidential relationship with his physician as the price for guaranteeing a third person 
access to a jury trial on matters arising from the patient's own treatment. 
Adoption of such a philosophy would violate the sanctity of the physician-patient 
relationship--a safe haven which would be severely threatened if the physician were obliged 
to obtain the signature of the patient's heirs to create an arbitration agreement. How is a 
patient to maintain privacy in his or her physician consultations when, in essence, an heir's 
intrusion into the relationship is a prerequisite to its formation? Such roadblocks to 
establishing an arbitration agreement would be at odds with Utah legislation allowing 
physician-patient arbitration agreements for claims arising from the treatment provided. 
The purpose of the Act is to facilitate, not eviscerate, the favored process of arbitration. 
IV ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS 
REQUIRED BY THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP. 
The legal nature of the physician-patient relationship requires enforcement of the 
arbitration agreement against the decedent's heirs5 wrongful death claims. The physician-
patient relationship is wholly voluntary, created by agreement, express or implied. Garay 
v. County of Bexar, 810 S.W2d 760, 764 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). Under this consensual 
physician-patient relationship, the patient seeks medical assistance and the physician agrees 
to render treatment. Heller v. Peekskill Community Hosp., 603 N.Y.S.2d 548 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1993). The physician-patient relationship is in this sense contractual, and the 
physician and the patient may agree to make an arbitration agreement a term of their 
relationship. £ee Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1996); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-17 (2002). 
The physician's legal duty of care is predicated on the existence of this physician-
patient relationship. See Dalley v. Utah Regional Med. Ctr., 791 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 
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1990); Farrow v. Health Servs. Corp.. 604 P.2d 474, 496 (Utah 1979). "A physician 
cannot be liable for medical malpractice unless the physician breaches a duty flowing from 
a physician-patient relationship.35 El Majzoub v. Appling, 95 S.W3d 432, 436 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2002). It is thus universally accepted that "a medical malpractice action may not be 
maintained in the absence of a physician-patient relationship.55 Gilinsky v. Indelicato, 894 
E Supp. 86, 90 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). Claims by a patient's wife for damages allegedly caused 
by medical negligence, he„ wrongful death, are thus predicated on her husband's 
physician-patient relationship. As the heirs5 claims are premised on the physician-patient 
relationship, they must be subject to the agreed-upon terms of that relationship: the 
Arbitration Agreement. 
In this case, the physician-patient relationship between the decedent and his 
physician is the point of origin for any malpractice claim against the physician, by either 
his wife, the estate, or any other heir. It was the decedent who entered into the physician-
patient relationship with Dr. Rosenthal, and they undisputedly contracted to make the 
Arbitration Agreement a term of their physician-patient relationship. Although Christine 
Baker and the other heirs are not signatories to the Agreement, they are bound by it as it 
defines the scope and conditions of the physician-patient relationship that forms the basis 
for their claims. 
The necessity of this result is well-illustrated in the informed consent context. 
Under Utah informed consent law, the physician has a duty to disclose to his patient "risks 
of injury [that] might be incurred from a proposed course of treatment." Lounsbury v. 
Capel 836 P.2d 188, 193 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). A 
physician's duty of disclosure arises from the physician-patient relationship and is owed to 
the patient, not to the patient's spouse or other family members. IdL at 198. The decision 
whether or not to agree to treatment in light of the risks is vested in the patient. L± at 
197. If the patient agrees to treatment and consents to the risks attendant thereto, his wife 
is bound by his consent. She could not file a loss of consortium or wrongful death claim 
on the basis that she did not personally consent to the risks of treatment, or did not sign 
the informed consent document. Thus the concept of investing the competent patient 
with complete and unbridled decision-maldng power relative to his/her care and all claims 
arising therefrom is fundamental to the physician-patient relationship under Utah law. 
V. FAILURE TO ENFORCE THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT WILL 
CREATE THE POTENTIAL FOR ANOMALOUS RESULTS WHEN 
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM AND SURVIVAL CLAIMS ARE ALSO 
ASSERTED. 
A. LOSS OF CONSORTIUM. 
If, as the trial court here ruled, arbitration agreements are held to be unenforceable 
against heirs for claims of wrongful death, then arbitration agreements logistically would 
also be held unenforceable against non-signing spouses for claims of loss of consortium. 
This would conflict with the fact that a loss of consortium claim is by statute a derivative 
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claim subject to all of the same defenses as the underlying negligence claim. Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-2-11 (1998). 
Moreover, if non-signatories are not bound to arbitrate claims of loss of consortium 
arisiijg out of medical care rendered by the physician, they could proceed to litigate that 
claim while the patient would be compelled to arbitrate claims for medical negligence 
arising out of the same medical care. The physician would have to answer in both 
arbitration and in a civil suit for claims dependent on identical facts regarding the 
professional standard of care, its breach by the defendant and causation of injury to die 
patient. This result is contrary to the purpose of the Arbitration Act, no savings would be 
effected, and there would be the potential for conflicting results. 
B. SURVIVAL CLAIMS. 
The failure to enforce arbitration agreements against heirs for claims of wrongful 
death would also be inconsistent with Utah law governing survival claims. The Utah 
survival statute provides: 
Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the 
person or death caused by the wrongful act or negligence of 
another do not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer or the 
injured person. The injured person or the personal 
representatives or heirs of the person who died have a cause of 
action against the wrongdoer or the personal representatives of 
the wrongdoer for special and general damages . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-ll-12(l)(a) (2002). 
Utah law is clear that wrongful death and survival claims are separate and distinct 
claims, allowing recovery of separate and distinct damages. Camp v. Office of Recovery 
Services, 779 P.2d 242, 2476 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). However, Utah law also provides 
that the personal representative of a decedent's estate is bound by contracts signed by the 
decedent. See In re Estate of Sheplev, 645 P.2d 605 (Utah 1982); see dso Colorado Nat'l 
Bank of Denver v. Friedman, 846 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1993) (en banc). Thus, a survival 
claim is subject to an arbitration agreement by the decedent. 
Wrongful death claims often go hand-in-hand with survival claims, as the starting 
point for both actions is an injury resulting in the decedent's death. If arbitration 
agreements were held to be unenforceable against heirs for claims of wrongful death, then 
the survival and wrongful death claims could be separated between the courts and 
arbitration. The result would unworkable, inefficient, and would create the potential for 
conflicting results. 
CONCLUSION 
The reasons requiring the non-signing heirs to be bound by an Arbitration 
Agreement are far more convincing than any arguments to avoid enforcement of that 
Agreement. It is not only consistent with the language of the Utah Arbitration statutes, 
but is essential to further the goals of the legislative and judicially declared policy favoring 
arbitration, to safeguard the physician-patient relationship, to preserve important privacy 
rights of the patient, and to honor the rights of parties to enter contracts. 
24 
DATED this ^ 5 day of February, 2004. 
By 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
111492] 
ELLIOTT JL WILLIAMS 
KURT MjRANKENBURG 
CAROLYN STEVENS JENSEN 
Attorneys for Utah Medical Association 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of February, 2004, two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Amicus Curiae Utah Medical Association were mailed 
postage prepaid thereon, by first class mail in die United States mail, to the following: 
Craig M. Snyder 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Brian P. Miller 
Kennetii L. Reich 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Larry R. White 
BURBIDGE & WHITE 
50 S. Main Street, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
R. Chet Loftis 
UTAH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 
540 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Elliott $^_\yilliams 
Kurt M. Frankenburg 
Carolyn Stevens Jensen 
26 
ADDENDA 
1. Stipulation Consenting to the Filing of Amicus Brief by die Utah Medical 
Association was filed with this Court on February 13, 2004; 
2. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 (2002), and the 
Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-31a-l through 20 (2002)(repealed 
effective May 15, 2003); and 
3. Arbitration Agreement. 
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ADDENDUM B 
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS 78-14-17 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — Liability of hospital or sanitarium 
for negligence of physician or surgeon, 51 
A.L.R.4th 235. 
78-14-16. Proceedings considered a binding arbitration 
hearing upon written agreement of parties — 
Compensation to members of panel. 
Upon written agreement by all parties, the proceeding may be considered a 
binding arbitration hearing and proceed under Title 78, Chapter 31a, except 
for the selection of the panel, which is done as set forth in Subsection 
78-14-12(4). If the proceeding is considered an arbitration proceeding, the 
parties are equally responsible for compensation to the members of the panel 
for services rendered. 
History: C. 1953, 78-14-16, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 238, § 5. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Arbitration of medical malpractice 
claims, 24 A.L.R.5th 1. 
78-14-17. Arbitration agreements. 
(1) After May 2, 1999, for a binding arbitration agreement between a 
patient and a health care provider to be validly executed or, if the requirements 
of this Subsection (1) have not been previously met on at least one occasion, 
renewed: 
(a) the patient shall be given, in writing and by verbal explanation, the 
following information on: 
(i) the requirement that the patient must arbitrate a claim instead 
of having the claim heard by a judge or jury; 
(ii) the role of an arbitrator and the manner in which arbitrators 
are selected under the agreement; 
(iii) the patient's responsibility, if any, for arbitration-related costs 
under the agreement; 
(iv) the right of the patient to decline to enter into the agreement 
and still receive health care; 
(v) the automatic renewal of the agreement each year unless the 
agreement is canceled in writing before the renewal date; and 
(vi) the right of the patient to have questions about the arbitration 
agreement answered; and 
(b) the agreement shall require that: 
(i) one arbitrator be collectively selected by all persons claiming 
damages; 
(ii) one arbitrator be selected by the health care provider; 
(iii) a third arbitrator be jointly selected by all persons claiming 
damages and the health care provider from a list of individuals 
approved as arbitrators by the state or federal courts of Utah; 
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(iv) all parties waive the requirement of Section 78-14-12 to appear 
before a hearing panel in a malpractice action against a health care 
provider; 
(v) the patient be given the right to rescind the agreement within 
30 days of signing the agreement; and 
(vi) the term of the agreement be for one year and that the 
agreement be automatically renewed each year unless the agreement 
is canceled in writing by the patient or health care provider before the 
renewal date. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a patient may not be denied health care 
of any kind on the sole basis that the patient or a person described in 
Subsection (5) refused to enter into a binding arbitration agreement with a 
health care provider. 
(3) A written acknowledgment of having received a written and verbal 
explanation of a binding arbitration agreement signed by or on behalf of the 
patient shall be a defense to a claim that the patient did not receive a written 
and verbal explanation of the agreement as required by Subsection (1) unless 
the patient: 
(a) proves that the person who signed the agreement lacked the 
capacity to do so; or 
(b) shows by clear and convincing evidence that the execution of the 
agreement was induced by the health care provider's affirmative acts of 
fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission to state material 
facts. 
(4) The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a claim governed by 
a binding arbitration agreement that was executed or renewed before May 3, 
1999. 
(5) A legal guardian or a person described in Subsection 78-14-5(4), eixcept a 
person temporarily standing in loco parentis, may execute or rescind a binding 
arbitration agreement on behalf of a patient. 
(6) This section does not apply to any arbitration agreement that is subject 
to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq. 
History: C. 1953, 78-14-17, enacted by L. became effective on May 3, 1999, pursuant to 
1999, ch. 278, § 1. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1999, ch. 278 
CHAPTER 14a 
LIMITATION OF THERAPIST'S 
DUTY TO WARN 
Section 
78-14a-101. Definitions. 
78-14a-102. Limitation of therapist's duty to 
warn. 
78-14a-101. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter, "therapist" means: 
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History: C. 3953, 78-30-18, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 39, § 5; 1992, ch. 30, § 182; 1995, 
ch. 20, i J £7. 
78-30-19. Restrictions on disclosure of information —Vio-
lations — Penalty. 
(1) Information maintained or filed with the bureau under this chapter may 
not be disclosed except as provided by this chapter, or pursuant to a court 
order. 
(2) Any person who discloses information obtained from the bureau's 
voluntary adoption registry in violation of this chapter, or knowingly allows 
that information to be disclosed in violation of this chapter is guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 78-30-19, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
1987, ch. 39, § 6. meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204 76-3-301 
CHAPTER 31 
ARBITRATION [REPEALED] 
78-31-1 to 78-31-22. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1986, ch 128, § 1 repeals effective April 28 1986 For present compara-
§§ 78-31-1 to 78-31-22, as originally enacted by ble provisions, see §§ 78-31a-l to 78-31a-20 
Laws 1951, Chapter 58, relating to arbitration, 
CHAPTER 31a 
ARBITRATION ACT [REPEALED 
EFFECTIVE MAY 15, 2003] 
Repealed effective May 15, 2003. — Laws 2002, ch 326, 
a new Chapter 31a in its place, effective May 15. 2003 
§ 33 repeals this chapter and enacts 
Section 
78-31a-l 
78-31a-2 
78-31a-3 
78-31a-4 
78-31a-5 
78-31a-6 
78-31a-7 
Short title [Repealed effective 
May 15, 2003] 
Definitions [Repealed effective 
May 15, 2003] 
Arbitration agreement [Re-
pealed effective Mav 15, 
2003] 
Court order to arbitrate [Re-
pea)ed effective Mav 15, 
2003] 
Appointment of arbitrators [Re-
pealed effective Mav 15, 
2003] 
Conference prior to arbitration 
hearing [Repealed effective 
May 15, 2003] 
Arbitration hearing — Pioce-
Section 
78-31a-8 
78-31a-9 
78-31a-10 
78-31a-ll 
78-31a-12 
78-31a-13 
dure [Repealed effective Ma\ 
15, 2003] 
Arbitration hearing — Powers 
of arbitrators [Repealed effec-
tive May 15, 2003] 
Arbitration hearing — Joinder 
of parties [Repealed effective 
May 15, 2003] 
Arbitration award [Repealed ef-
fective May 15, 2003] 
Costs [Repealed effective May 
15, 2003] 
Confirmation of award [Re-
pealed effective May 15 
2003] 
Modification of award bv arbi-
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Section 
trators [Repealed effective 
May 15, 2003]. 
78-31a-14. Vacation of the award by court 
[Repealed effective May 15, 
2003]. 
78-31a-15. Modification of award by court 
[Repealed effective May 15, 
2003]. 
78-31a-16. Award as judgment [Repealed 
effective May 15, 2003]. 
His to ry : C. 1953, 78-31a-l, e n a c t e d by L. 
1985, ch . 225, § 1. 
R e p e a l e d effective May 15, 2003. — Laws 
2002, ch. 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and 
enacts a new Chapter 31a in its place, effective 
May 15, 2003. 
M e a n i n g of " th i s act. ' ' — The phrase "this 
act r means Laws 1985, Chapter 225, which 
enacted this chapter. 
ANALYSIS 
Future disputes. 
Cited. 
F u t u r e d i s p u t e s . 
State law has favored arbitration provisions 
U t a h Law Review. — Attorney-Client Fee 
Arbitration: A Dissenting View, 1990 Utah L. 
Rev. 277. 
Conditions Under Which Oral Arbitration 
Agreements Become Binding, 1999 Utah L. 
Rev. 1054. 
B r i g h a m Young L a w Review. — Alterna-
tives to the Tort System for the Nonmedical 
Professions: Can They Do the Job?, 1981 B.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 57. 
J o u r n a l of C o n t e m p o r a r y Law. — Pre-
emption of State Arbitration Statutes: the Ex-
aggerated Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration, 
19 J. Con temp. L. 1 (1993). 
J o u r n a l of E n e r g y L a w a n d Pol icy. — 
Settling Flood Hazard Conflict: The Utah Lake 
and Jordan River Experience, 8 J. Energy L. & 
Pol'y 199 (1988). 
Am. J u r . 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arbitration 
and Award § 1 et seq. 
C.J .S . — 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 1 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Availability and scope of declara-
tory judgment actions in determining rights of 
Section 
78-31a-17. Motions [Repealed pflectivr 
May 15, 2003) 
78-31a-18. Location for arbitration !!<<• 
pealed effective Mav LV 
2003]. 
78-31a-19. Appeals [Repealed eJTeolivr 
May 15, 2003]. 
78-31a-20. Scope of chapter [Repealed H 
fective May 15, 2003]. 
Seve rab i l i t y C l a u s e s . — Section 2 of Lawi-
1985, ch. 225 provided: "If any provision of thii-
act, or the application of any provision to am 
person or circumstance, is held invalid, thf 
remainder of this act is given effect without the 
invalid provision or application." 
Cross -Refe rences . — Fire fighters' negotia-
tions, §§ 34-20a-7 to 34-20a-9. 
covering future disputes since 1977. Allred v. 
Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 909 P.2d 1263 (Utah 
1996). 
Ci ted in Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young 
Univ., 2000 UT 46, 1 P.3d 1095. 
parties, or powers and exercise thereof by arbi-
trators, under arbitration agreements, 12 
A.L.R.3d 854. 
Validity and effect, and remedy in respect, of 
contractual stipulation to submit disputes to 
arbitration in another jurisdiction, 12 A.L.R.3d 
892. 
Municipal corporation's power to submit to 
arbitration, 20 A.L.R.3d 569. 
Uninsured motorist endorsement, validity 
and enforceability of provision for binding arbi-
tration, and waiver thereof, 24 A.L.R.3d 1325. 
Delay in asserting contractual right to arbi-
tration as precluding enforcement thereof, 25 
A.L.R.3d 1171. 
Waiver of, or estoppel to assert, substantive 
right or right to arbi trate as question for court 
or arbitrator, 26 A.L.R.3d 604. 
Enforcement, breach or repudiation of collec-
tive labor contract as subject to, or as affecting 
right to enforce, arbitration provision in con-
tract, 29 A.L.R.3d 688. 
Validity and construction of state s ta tutes 
78-31a-l. Short title [Repealed effective May 15, 2003]. 
This act shall be known as the "Utah Arbitration Act." 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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making breach of a collective labor contract an 
unfair labor practice, 30 A L R 3d 431 
Breach or repudiation of contract as affectum 
right to enforce arbitration clause therein, 32 
A L R 3 d 3 7 7 
Privileged nature of communications made in 
course of grievance or arbitration procedure 
provided for by collective bargaining agree-
ment, 6 0 A L R 3 d 1041 
Application of labor dispute disqualification 
for benefits to locked out emplovee, 62 A L R 3d 
437 
Validity and construction of statutes or ordi-
nances providing for arbitration of labor dis-
putes involving public employees, 68 A L R 3d 
885 
Demand for or submission to arbitration as 
affecting enforcement of mechanic's hen, 73 
A L R 3 d 1042 
Filing of mechanic's hen or proceeding for its 
enforcement as affecting right to arbitration, 73 
A L R 3 d 1066 
Statute of limitations as bar to arbitration 
under agreement, 94 A L R 3d 533 
Defendant's participation m action as waiver 
of right to arbitration of dispute involved 
therein, 98 A L R 3d 767 
Claim of fraud in inducement of contract as 
subject to compulsory arbitration dause con-
tained in contract, 11 A L R 4th 774 
Failure to pursue or exhaust remedies under 
union contract as affecting employee's right of 
state civil action for retaliatory discharge, 32 
A L R 4th 350 
Liability of organization sponsoring or ad-
ministering arbitration to parties involved m 
proceeding, 41 A L R 4th 1013 
Attorney's submission of dispute to arbitra-
tion, or amendment of arbitration agreement, 
without client's knowledge or consent, 48 
A L R 4th 127 
Arbitration of medical malpractice claims, 24 
A L R 5th 1 
Validity and construction of agreement be-
tween attorney and client to arbitrate disputes 
arising between them, 26 A L R 5th 107 
Validity and construction of provisions for 
arbitration of disputes as to alimony or support 
payments or child visitation or custody mat-
ters, 38 A L R 5th 69 
Participation in arbitration proceedings as 
waiver to objections to arbitrabihty under state 
law, 56 A L R 5th 757 
Validity and effect under state law of arbitra-
tion agreement provision for alternative 
method of appointment of arbitrator where one 
party fails or refuses to follow appointment 
procedure specified in agreement, 75 A L R 5th 
595 
Re-exhaustion of arbitration procedure as 
appropriate course for resolving backpay issues 
arising as a result of resolution of grievance, 59 
AL fR Fed 501 
Employee s right to intervene in federal judi-
cial proceeding concerning labor arbitration 
award, 59 A L R Fed 733 
Consolidation by federal court of arbitration 
proceedings brought under Federal Arbitration 
Act (9 USCS § 4), 104 A L R Fed 251 
78-31a-2. Definitions [Repealed effective May 15, 2003]. 
(1) "Arbitrators" means one or more arbitrators as appointed by the court or 
agreed upon by the parties 
(2) "Court" means any state district court in Utah 
His to ry : C. 1953, 78-31 a-2, e n a c t e d by L. 
1985, ch . 225, § 1. 
R e p e a l e d effective May 15, 2003. — Laws 
2002, ch 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and 
enacts a new Chapter 31a m its place, effective 
May 15 2003 
Cross -Refe rences . — Board of labor, concil-
iation and arbitration. Utah Const , Art XVI, 
Sec 2 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
"Court." 
This chapter creates a statutory remedy for 
judicial enforcement, modification, or vacation 
of an arbitration award, and specifically pro-
vides that the remedy will be implemented by 
proceedings m the district courts of this state 
TVansworld Sys v Robison, 796 P2d 407 (Utah 
Ct App 1990j 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am J u r 2d Arbitration C.J .S . — 6 C J S Arbitration § 58 
and Award § 84 
78-31 a-3. Arbitration agreement [Repealed effective May 
15, 2003]. 
A written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to 
arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds existing 
at law or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged as 
provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
His to ry : C. 1953, 78-31 a-3, e n a c t e d by L. 
1985, ch. 225, § 1. 
R e p e a l e d effective May 15, 2003. — Laws 
2002, ch 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and 
enacts a new Chapter 31a m its place, effective 
May 15, 2003 
Cross -Refe rences . — Labor Commission to 
promote voluntary arbitration of labor dis-
putes, § 34A-M03 
ANALYSIS 
Municipal corporations 
Oral modification 
Prerequisites 
Unconscionabihty 
—Procedural 
— Substantive 
Waiver 
Cited 
Municipal corporations. 
Absent a statutory prohibition, a municipal 
corporation has the power to submit to arbitra-
tion any claim asserted by or against it Lmdon 
City v"Engineers Constr C o , 636 P2d 1070 
(Utah 1981) 
Ora l modif ica t ion . 
Because standard principles of contract con-
struction allow parties to agree to modify a 
written contract by their conduct or oral agree-
ment, an unwritten agreement to modify the 
jurisdiction of an arbitrator was enforceable 
Pacific Dev, L C v Orton, 1999 UT App 217, 
982 P 2d 94 
Prerequis i tes . 
Because this section provides tha t only a 
written agreement to submit a claim to arbitra-
tion is valid and enforceable, an arbitration 
agreement must be written to be enforceable 
under § 78 31a-4 Jenkins v Percival, 962 P 2d 
796 (Utah 1998) 
Partnership, single par tner may not submit 
to arbitration, § 48-1-6 
Policy that work terms and conditions should 
result from voluntary agreement, § 34-20-1 
Public transit district labor disputes § 17A-
2-1032 
Water disputes, informal arbitration by state 
engineer, § 73-2-16 
Unconscionabi l i ty . 
—Procedural . 
Where patient was given the physician-pa-
tient arbitration agreement to sign jus t min-
utes before her surgery without any opportu-
nity to discuss the terms of the agreement or 
the option of not signing it, the elements of 
procedural unconscionabihty surrounded the 
negotiation of this agreement Sosa v Paulos, 
924 P2d 357 (Utah 1996) 
— S u b s t a n t i v e . 
The term in a physician-patient arbitration 
agreement, requiring the arbitration panel to 
be comprised of neutral ly selected orthopedic 
surgeons, is not when standing alone, "so one-
sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an 
innocent party" and constitute susbstantive un-
conscionabihty Sosa v Paulos, 924 P 2 d 357 
(Utah 1996) 
The term m a physician-patient arbitration 
agreement, requiring payment of costs by a 
patient who wins less than half the amount of 
damages sought in arbitration, is substantively 
unconscionable on its face, considering tha t 
under this term, the pat ient mus t pay the 
doctor's attorney's fees and costs, even in situ-
ations where the physician is determined to 
have committed malpractice Sosa v Paulos, 
924 P2d 357 (Utah 1996) 
Waiver. 
Waiver of a contractual right of arbitrat ion 
must be based on both a finding of participation 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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in litigation to a point inconsistent with the 
intent to arbitrate and a finding of prejudice; 
both prongs of this test turn on the facts of the 
individual case and, furthermore, consistent 
with policy considerations, any real detriment 
is sufficient to support a finding of prejudice. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arbitration 
and Award §§ 11 to 53. 
C.J.S. — 6 C.J.S. Arbitration §§ 7 to 57. 
A.L.R. — Attorney's submission of dispute to 
arbitration, or amendment of arbitration agree-
ment, without client's knowledge or consent, 48 
A.L.R.4th 127. 
ANALYSIS 
Arbitration agreement. 
Notice. 
Arbitration agreement. 
A provision in a professional agreement be-
tween employees and a school district creating 
a grievance procedure by which an employee 
could seek review of the employer's actions 
within the chain of command, ultimately reach-
ing the elected board of directors of the district. 
Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 R2d 
356 (Utah 1992). 
Cited in AJlred v. Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 
909 R2d 1263 (Utah 1996). 
Participation in arbitration proceedings as 
waiver to objections to arbitrability under state 
law, 56 A.L.R.5th 757. 
Awarding attorneys' fees in connection with 
arbitration, 60 A.L.R.5th 669. 
was not an agreement to submit a dispute to 
arbitration. Reed v. Davis County Sch. Dist., 
892 P.2d 1063 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Because § 78-31 a-3 provides that only a 
written agreement to submit a claim to arbitra-
tion is valid and enforceable, an arbitration 
agreement must be written to be enforceable 
under this section. Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 
796 (Utah 1998). 
Because parties to binding arbitration waive 
substantial rights to formal public adjudication 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-31a-4. Court order to arbitrate [Repealed effective 
May 15, 2003]. 
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an 
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is raised 
concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of the 
matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those issues and 
order or deny arbitration accordingly. 
(2) If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged arbitration agreement 
is involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court having jurisdic-
tion to hear motions to compel arbitration, the motion shall be made to that 
court. Otherwise, the motion shall be made to a court with proper venue. 
(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitration stays any action or 
proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement. 
However, if the issue is severable from the other issues in the action or 
proceeding, only the issue subject to arbitration is stayed. If a motion is made 
in an action or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall include a stay of the 
action or proceeding. 
(4) Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate may not be grounded on a claim 
that an issue subject to arbitration lacks merit, or that fault or grounds for the 
claim have not been shown. 
History: C. 1953, 78-31a-4, enacted by L. 2002, ch. 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and 
1985, ch. 225, § 1. enacts a new Chapter 31a in its place, effective 
Repealed effective May 15, 2003. — Laws May 15, 2003. 
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of their disputes, the Act demands, as a mini-
mum threshold for its enforcement, direct and 
specific evidence of an agreement between the 
parties, and in the absence of such direct evi-
dence, the proponent of arbitration has failed to 
"show an agreement to arbitrate," as required 
by the Act. McCoy v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
of Utah, 2001 UT 31, 20 R3d 901. 
Notice. 
Because an arbitration agreement was an 
amendment to the plaintiff's insurance policy, 
it was binding on him only if he was afforded 
proper notice of the amendment. McCoy v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield, 1999 UT App 199, 980 
P.2d 694, afTd, 20 P.3d 901 (Utah 2001). 
Where the defendant failed to show that 
written notice of an arbitration provision was 
sent to the plaintiff, failing even to establish 
that notice of the policy amendment was sent to 
any specific policy holders, the evidence was 
insufficient to establish compliance with the 
policy's notice provision. McCoy v. Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield, 1999 UT App 199, 980 R2d 694, 
aff'd, 20 P.3d 901 (Utah 2001). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arbitration 
and Award §§ 32 to 34. 
C.J.S. — 6 C.J.S. Arbitration §§ 23, 29 to 32. 
A.L.R. — State court's power to consolidate 
arbitration proceedings, 64 A.L.R.3d 528. 
Order or decree compelling or refusing to 
compel arbitration, 6 A.L.R.4th 652. 
Which statute of limitations applies to efforts 
to compel arbitration of a dispute, 77 A.L.R.4th 
1071. 
Stay of action in federal court until determi-
nation of similar action pending in state court, 
5 A.L.R. Fed. 10. 
Appealability of order staying or refusing to 
stay, proceedings in federal district court pend-
ing arbitration proceedings, 11 A.L.R. Fed. 640. 
Appealability of federal court order granting 
or denying stay of arbitration, 31 A.L.R. Fed. 
234. 
Disposition by bankruptcy court of request 
for arbitration pursuant to arbitration agree-
ment to which debtor in bankruptcy is a party, 
72 A.L.R. Fed. 890. 
What statute of limitations applies to action 
to compel arbitration pursuant to § 301 of 
Labor Management Relations Act (29 USCS 
§ 185), 96 A.L.R. Fed. 378. 
78-31 a-5. Appointment of arbitrators [Repealed effective 
May 15, 2003]. 
(1) If the arbitration agreement specifies a procedure for appointment of 
arbitrators, it shall be followed. 
(2) If no procedure is specified, or if the agreed method fails or cannot be 
followed for any reason, or if an arbitrator fails or is unable to act, any party 
to the arbitration agreement may move the court to appoint one or more 
arbitrators, as necessary. 
(3) The motion shall state: 
(a) the issues to be arbitrated; 
(b) any arbitrators the party may propose for appointment; and 
(c) the qualifications of any proposed arbitrators. 
(4) Upon this motion, the court shall appoint the necessary arbitrators, 
whom the court shall find qualified to arbitrate the issues stated in the motion. 
History: C. 1953, 78-31 a-5, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 225, § 1. 
Repealed effective May 15, 2003. — Laws 
2002, ch. 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and 
enacts a new Chapter 31a in its place, effective 
May 15, 2003. 
Cross-References. — Service of notices, 
U.R.C.P. 6(d), (e). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arbitration 
and Award §§ 84 to 107. 
C.J.S. — 6 C.J.S. Arbitration §§ 58 to 75. 
A.L.R. — Validity and effect under state law 
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of arbitration agreement provision for alterna- procedure specified in agreement, 75 A.L.R.5th 
tive method of appointment of arbitrator where 595. 
one party fails or refuses to follow appointment 
78-31 a-6. Conference prior to arbitration hearing [Re-
pealed effective May 15, 2003]. 
(1) The arbitrators either in their discretion, or at the request of any party, 
may conduct a conference prior to the arbitration hearing. The conference shall 
be held no fewer than ten days before the arbitration hearing. Notice of the 
conference shall be made by certified mail to all parties to the arbitration 
hearing, and no fewer than ten days before the conference. 
(2) The subpoena powers provided in Section 78-31a-8 apply to conferences 
conducted under this section. 
(3) The conference shall allow the parties to consider any matters which 
may aid in the disposition of the arbitration hearing, including, but not limited 
to: 
(a) identifying and clarifying the issues; 
(b) determining the scope and scheduling of discovery of evidence under 
Section 78-31a-7; 
(c) stipulating to the admission of facts and documents; 
(d) identity of witnesses. 
(4) The arbitrators shall make a written record of action taken at the 
conference, including a finding of any agreements made between the parties 
regarding matters discussed. This finding controls at the arbitration hearing, 
unless the arbitrators find that a modification at the hearing is necessary to 
prevent a manifest injustice. 
History: C. 1953, 78-31a-6, enacted by L. 2002, ch. 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and 
1985, ch. 225, § 1. enacts a new Chapter 31a in its place, effective 
Repealed effective May 15, 2003. — Laws May 15, 2003. 
78-31 a-7. Arbitration hearing — Procedure [Repealed ef-
fective May 15, 2003]. 
(1) The arbitrators shall appoint a time and place for the arbitration 
hearing and serve each party to the proceeding with notice of the time and 
place, personally or by certified mail. Notice shall be served not fewer than 30 
days before the date of hearing, unless both parties stipulate to a waiver or 
modification of this notice requirement. Appearance at the hearing waives the 
notice required by this section. The arbitrators may adjourn the hearing from 
time to time as necessary, and on request of a party or upon their own motion 
may postpone the hearing to a date not later than the date fixed by the 
arbitration agreement for making the award, unless the parties consent to a 
later date. The arbitrators shall hear and determine the controversy upon the 
evidence produced, notwithstanding that a party duly notified fails to appear. 
The court upon motion may direct the arbitrators to proceed promptly with the 
hearing and determination of the controversy. 
(2) Each party to the arbitration proceeding is entitled, in person or through 
counsel, to be heard, to present evidence material to the controversy, and to 
cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing. 
(3) The hearing shall be recorded in a manner agreed upon by the parties. 
Costs of making a record shall be apportioned as directed by the arbitrators. 
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(4) The hearing shall be conducted by all the arbitrators, but a simple 
majority of them may determine any questions and render a final award. If 
during the course of the hearing an arbitrator for any reason ceases to act, the 
remaining arbitrator or arbitrators may continue the hearing and determina-
tion of the controversy, or additional arbitrators may be appointed as provided 
in Section 78-31a-5. 
(5) Unless otherwise provided by the arbitration agreement or by law, the 
powers of the arbitrators are exercised by majority vote. 
History: C. 1953, 78-31 a-7, enacted by L. enacts a new Chapter 31a in its place, effective 
1985, ch. 225, § 1. May 15, 2003. 
Repealed effective May 15, 2003. — Laws Cross-References. — Service of notices, 
2002, ch. 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and U.R.C.R 6(d), (e). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Right to produce evidence and be heard. 
N . The parties have a right to be heard on their 
, - , . , ' , ., - . I T i proofs, and it is the duty of arbitrators to hear 
Right to produce evidence and be heard.
 n ., . -, * • i * A u *± 
e
 ^ all the evidence material to the matter in 
Notice. controversy. Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 Utah 
It is sufficient if the parties admit in their 442, 15 R2d 353 (1932). 
pleadings notice of the meeting of arbitrators. 
Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 Utah 442, 15 P.2d 
353 (1932). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arbitration before appraisers and arbitrators appointed to 
and Award §§ 108 to 123. determine amount of loss, 25 A.L.R.3d 680. 
C.J.S. — 6 C.J.S. Arbitration §§ 76 to 94. Participation in arbitration proceedings as 
A.L.R. — Insurance, necessity and suffi- waiver to objections to arbitrability under state 
ciency of notice of and hearing in proceedings law, 56 A.L.R.5th 757. 
78-31 a-8. Arbitration hearing — Powers of arbitrators 
[Repealed effective May 15, 2003]. 
(1) Arbitrators may administer oaths and issue subpoenas for the atten-
dance of witnesses or the production of books, records, documents, and other 
evidence. Subpoenas shall be served, and upon motion to the court by a party 
or the arbitrators, enforced as provided by law for the service and enforcement 
of subpoenas in civil actions. 
(2) The arbitrators either in their discretion, or at the request of any party, 
may order: 
(a) a party to provide any other party with information which is 
determined by the arbitrator to be relevant to the determination of the 
issues to be arbitrated; or 
(b) the use of requests for discovery as provided in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, except that the time a party has to respond to any 
discovery request shall be determined by the arbitrators in their discre-
tion. 
(3) Any law compelling a person under subpoena to testify is applicable to 
this chapter. 
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(4) The same fees prescribed for the attendance of witnesses in civil actions 
shall be paid to witnesses subpoenaed in arbitration proceedings 
History: C. 1953, 78-33 a-8, enacted by L Contempt of process of nonjudicial officer, 
3985, ch. 225, * 3. " $ 78-32-15 
Repealed effective Ma> 35, 2003. — Law* Depositions and discovery generally, U R C P 
2002 ch 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and 26 to 37 
enacts a new Chapter 31a in its place effective Subpoenas, U R C P 45 
May 15, 2003 Witnesses' fees § 78-46 28 
Cross-Keierences. — Contempt general]} 
§ 78 32 1 et seq 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am Jur 2d Arbitration C.J.S. — 6 C J S Arbitration § 87 
and Award § 121 
78-31 a-9. Arbitration hear ing — Joinder of par t ies [Re-
pealed effective May 15, 2003]. 
(1) Upon motion to the arbitration panel by any party, a person who is 
subject to service of process for the subject matter of the arbitration, and who 
is a party to the arbitration agreement, shall be joined as a party in the action 
if (a) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those who are 
already parties, or (b) he claims or the motion alleges he has an interest 
relating to the subject of the action and the disposition of the action in his 
absence impedes his ability to protect that interest, or subjects any of the 
persons already parties to a substantial risk of incurred multiple or otherwise 
inconsistent obligations by reasons of his claimed interest 
(2) Any person joined as a party to the arbitration has the same time to 
answer as was given to the initial defendant in the case 
History: C. 1953, 78-31 a-9, enacted by L. 2002 ch 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and 
1985, ch. 225, ^ 1. enacts a new Chapter 31a in its place, effective 
Repealed effective May 15, 2003. — Laws May 15, 2003 
78-31 a-10. Arbitrat ion award [Repealed effective May 15, 
2003]. 
(1) The arbitration award shall be in writing and signed by the arbitrators 
who join in the award A copy of the award shall be served upon each party 
personally, or by certified mail, or as otherwise provided by the arbitration 
agreement 
(2) An arbitration award shall be made within the time set by the agree-
ment, or if a time is not set, within a time the court orders pursuant to the 
motion of any party to the arbitration proceeding The parties may at any time, 
by written agreement, extend the time for award A party to an arbitration 
proceeding waives any objection based on the ground that the award was not 
timely rendered unless the arbitrators are notified of the objection before 
service of the award 
History: C. 1953, 78-31 a-10, enacted by L 2002 ch 326 § 33 repeals this chaptei and 
1985, ch. 225, ^ 1. enacts a new Chapter 31a in its place, effective 
Repealed effective May 15, 2003. — Law « May 15 2003 
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Cross-References. — Affirmative defense, 
arbitration and award as, U R C P 8(c) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Effect and conclusiveness of award 
Procedural requirements 
Effect and conclusiveness of award. 
The award of arbitrators, acting withm the 
scope of their authority, determines the rights 
of the parties to it as efficiently as a judgment 
secured by legal procedure, and is binding on 
the parties until set aside or its validity is 
questioned in some proper manner Gianno-
pulos v Pappas, 80 Utah 442, 15 P2d 353 
(1932) 
Procedural requirements. 
An arbitration award will not be disturbed on 
account of irregularities or informalities, fail 
ure to comply with procedural requirement^ 
such as the signature requirement in this sec 
tion is an irregularity and as such cannot b\ 
itself support appellate intervention Allred \ 
Educators Mut Ins Ass'n, 909 P2d 1263 (Utah 
1996) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am Jur 2d Arbitration 
and Award §§ 124 to 150 
C.J.S. — 6 C J S Arbitration §§ 95 to 122 
A.L.R. — Determination of validity of arbi-
tration award under requirement that arbitra-
tors shall pass on all matters submitted, 36 
A L R 3d 649 
Construction and effect of contractual or stat-
utory provisions fixing time withm which arbi-
tration award must be made, 56 A L R 3d 815 
Modern status of rules respecting concur-
rence of all arbitrators as condition of binding 
award under private agreement not specifying 
unanimity, 83 A L R 3d 996 
Arbitrator's power to award punitive dam-
ages, 83 A L R 3d 1037 
Referee's failure to file report within time 
specified by statute, court order, or stipulation 
as terminating reference, 71 A L R 4th 889 
78-31 a-11. Costs [Repealed effective May 15, 2003]. 
The expenses, fees, and other costs of the arbitrators, exclusive of attorney's 
fees, shall be paid as provided in the award, unless another provision for the 
payment of fees is made in the arbitration agreement. 
History: C. 3953, 78-31a-ll, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 225, § 1. 
Repealed effective May 15, 2003. — Laws 
2002, ch 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and 
enacts a new Chapter 31a in its place, effective 
May 15, 2003 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am Jur 2d Arbitration 
and Award § 139 
C.J.S. — 6 C J S Arbitration §§ 179 to 183 
A.L.R. — Liability of parties to arbitration 
for costs, fees, and expenses, 57 A L R 3d 633 
Awarding attorneys' fees in connection with 
arbitration, 60 A L R 5th 669 
78-31 a-12. Confirmation of award [Repealed effective 
May 15, 2003]. 
Upon motion to the court by any party to the arbitration proceeding for the 
confirmation of the award, and 20 days notice to all parties, the court shall 
confirm the award unless a motion is timely filed to vacate or modify the 
award. 
History: C. 1953, 78-31 a-12, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 225, * 1. 
Repealed effective May 15, 2003. — Laws 
2002, ch 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and 
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enacts a new Chapter 31a in. its place, effective Cross-References. — Motions and orders 
May 15, 2003 generally, U R C.P. 6(b), 6(d), 6(e), 7(b), 43(b). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited m Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young 
Univ., 2000 UT 46, 1 P.3d 1095 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 6 C.J.S. Arbitration §§ 120 to 122 
78-31 a-13. Modification of award by arbitrators [Re-
pealed effective May 15, 2003]. 
(1) Upon motion of any party to the arbitrators or upon order of the court 
pursuant to a motion, the arbitrators may modify the award if: 
(a) there is an evident miscalculation of figures or description of a 
person or property referred to in the award; 
(b) the award is imperfect as to form; or 
(c) necessary to clarify any part of the award. 
(2) A motion to the arbitrators for modification of an award shall be made 
within 20 days after sendee of the award upon the moving party. Written notice 
that a motion has been made shall be promptly served personally or by 
certified mail upon all other parties to the proceeding. The notice of motion for 
modification shall contain a statement that objections to the motion be served 
upon the moving party within ten days after receipt of the notice. Any award 
modified by the arbitrators is subject to the provisions of Sections 78-31a-ll, 
78-31a-12, and 78-31a-14. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3la-13, enacted by L. enacts a new Chapter 31a m its place, effective 
1985, ch. 225, fc 1. May 15, 2003 
Repealed effective May 15, 2003. — Laws Cross-References. — Motions and orders 
2002, ch 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and generally, U R C.P. 6(b), 6(d), 6(e), 7(b), 43(b) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS either modify or vacate an award forecloses a 
comprehensive review on the merits of the 
Failure to timely file arbitration process. Allred v. Educators Mut. 
Time for filing motion
 ] n s A s g , n j 9 0 9 R 2 ( j 1 2 6 3 ( U t a h 1 9 9 6 ) 
—Alter judgment confirming award 
_ ., , __ Time for filing motion. 
Failure to timeJy file. 
The procedural safeguards set out m Subsec- —After judgment confirming award. 
tion (1) of this section and 78-31a-14(2) are The filing of motions to vacate or modify an 
designed to protect against arbitrary, unfair, or award is barred once the court has entered a 
prejudicial treatment m the arbitration pro- judgment confirming the award. Robinson & 
cess, however, failure to timely file a motion to Wells v Warren, 669 P.2d 844 (Utah 1983) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am Jur 2d Arbitration award because of incompleteness or failure to 
and Award § 143 pass on all matters submitted, 36 A.L.R.3d 939 
A.L.R. — Power of arbitrator to correct, oi Power of court to resubmit matter to arbitra-
power of court to correct or resubmit, nonlaboi tors for correction or clarification, because of 
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ambiguity or error m, or omission from, arbi-
tration award, 37 A L R 3d 200 
78-31a-14. Vacation of the award by court [Repealed ef-
fective May 15, 2003]. 
(1) Upon motion to the court by any party to the arbitration proceeding for 
vacation of the award, the court shall vacate the award if it appears* 
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; 
(b) an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral, showed partiality, or an 
arbitrator was guilty of misconduct that prejudiced the rights of any party; 
(c) the arbitrators exceeded their powers; 
(d) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause 
shown, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise 
conducted the hearing to the substantial prejudice of the rights of a party, 
or 
(e) there was no arbitration agreement between the parties to the 
arbitration proceeding. 
(2) A motion to vacate an award shall be made to the court within 20 days 
after a copy of the award is served upon the moving party, or if predicated upon 
corruption, fraud, or other undue means, within 20 days after the grounds are 
known or should have been known. 
(3) If an award is vacated on grounds other than in Subsection (l)(e), the 
court may order a rehearing before new arbitrators chosen as provided in the 
arbitration agreement or by the court. Arbitrators chosen by the court shall be 
found qualified to arbitrate the issues involved. The time for making an award, 
if specified in the arbitration agreement, is applicable to a rearbitration 
proceeding. If not specified, the court shall order the award upon rearbitration 
to be made within a reasonable time. The time for making an award under a 
rearbitration proceeding commences on the date of the court's order for 
rearbitration. 
(4) If the motion to vacate is denied and no motion to modify or correct the 
award is pending, the court shall confirm the award. 
History: C. 1953, 78-31a-14, enacted by L. enacts a new Chapter 31a m its place, effective 
1985, ch. 225, § 1. May 15, 2003 
Repealed effective May 15, 2003. — Laws C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Motions and orders 
2002, ch 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and generally, U R C P 6(b), 6(d), 6(e), 7(b), 43(b) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
—Tolling provision 
Cited 
Affidavit or t e s t imony of arbitrator. 
While an arbitrator may not by affidavit or 
testimony impeach his own award or show 
fraud or misconduct on the par t of the arbitra-
tors or any of them, the testimony or affidavit of 
an arbitrator is admissible to establish what 
matters were presented to and considered by 
the arbitrators, and any arbitrator is a compe-
tent witness to establish such facts Gianno-
pulos v Pappas, 80 Utah 442, 15 P2d 353 
(1932) 
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Affidavit or testimony of arbitrator 
Grounds 
— In general 
— Arbitrator exceeded powers 
—Corruption, fraud, etc 
—Misconduct 
—No factual basis 
—Partial i ty 
— Refusal to hear evidence 
— Statutory grounds exclusive 
Time for filing motion 
—After judgment confirming award 
ARBITRATION ACT [REPEALED EFF MAY 15, 2003] 7 8 - 3 1 a - 1 4 
Grounds. 
—In general . 
Awards will not be disturbed on account of 
irregularities or informalities or because the 
court does not agree with the award, so long as 
the proceeding has been fair and honest, and 
the substantial rights of the parties have been 
respected Bivans v Utah Lake Land Water & 
Power Co , 53 Utah 601, 174 P 1126 (1918) 
Ordinarily a court has no authority to review 
the action of arbitrators to conect eirors or to 
substitute its conclusion foi that of the arbitra 
tors acting honestly and within the scope of 
their authority Giannopulos v Pappas, 80 
Utah 442, 15 P2d 353 (1932) Utility Trailer 
Sales of Salt Lake, Inc v Fake, 740 P2d 1327 
(Utah 1987) 
Subsection (1) provides relief for certain de-
fined impropneties that aie evident to a partv 
by the close of the proceeding or upon receipt of 
the award, and Subsection (2)s twenty-day 
time bar ensures that parties will not bring 
belated challenges based upon information 
known or that reasonably should have known 
before the expiration of the twentv-day time 
bar DeVore v IHC Hosps 884 P2d 1246 (Utah 
1994) 
When an award is challenged on the ground 
that the arbitiator exceeded his or her author-
ity, the trial court applies a two-pronged test 
First, a court must review the submission 
agreement and determine whether the arbitra-
tor's award covers areas not contemplated b> 
the agieement The second prong to be applied 
by the trial court is to determine whether an 
award is "without foundation m leason or fact ' 
This second prong is referred to as the "irra-
tionality principle' and is based on the assump-
tion that the parties, by their agreement to 
aibitrate, h a \ e given the arbitrator the authoi 
ity to decide their dispute on a rational basis 
Softsolutions lnc v Bngham Young Um\ 
2000 UT 46, 1 P3d 1095 
The distnct court properly applied the two-
pronged test m Buzas Baseball lnc v Salt 
Lake Trappeis lnc 925 P 2d 941 lUtah 1996) 
m determining that there was no basis to 
vacate the awaid under Subsection (l)(c) of this 
section, where the arbitrator clearlv stayed 
within the confines of the Submission Agree-
ment, and his ruling had a foundation in reason 
and fact Softsoiutions, lnc v Bngham ^oung 
Umv, 2000 UT 46, 1 P3d 1095 
— A r b i t r a t o r exceeded p o w e r s . 
The arbitratoi exceeded the a u t h o r ^ 
granted to him where he considered things not 
addressed in the arbitration agreement be-
tween the parties, because any modification 
must be in writing and a written arbitiation 
agreement mav not be implicitly modified 
merely bv the parties actions m bringing evi-
dence of matters outside the scope of the agree-
ment Pacific Dev, L C. v Orton, 2001 UT 36, 
23 P3d 1035 
—Corruption, fraud, etc. 
Fraud, bad faith, and prejudicial imposition 
will vitiate an award, even though a contract of 
submission provides tha t such award shall be 
absolute and conclusive and v i thout appeal 
Bivans v Utah Lake Land, Water & Power Co , 
53 Utah 601, 174 P. 1126 (1918) 
—Misconduct. 
Before the misconduct of any arbitrators will 
afford a ground for vacating an award, it must 
appear tha t the rights of a party have been 
prejudiced Giannopulos v Pappas, 80 Utah 
442, 1 5 P 2 d 353(1932) 
— No factual basis . 
Where an arbitrator specifically recognized 
the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, 
but concluded that , without a factual basis for 
the plaintiff's allegation, the plaintiff had not 
met its burden of proof, the arbitrator did not 
manifestly disregard the law m finding no sup-
port for the argument tha t the defendant had 
breached its implied duty of good faith Pacific 
Dev, L C v Orton, 1999 UT App 217, 982 P2d 
94 
— Partiality. 
A court shall vacate an award under Subsec-
tion (1Kb) if a reasonable person would con-
clude that an arbitrator, appointed as neutral, 
showed partiality or was guilty of misconduct 
that prejudiced the rights of any party Fur-
thermore, the burden of proof falls on the 
movant, and the evidence of partiality must be 
certain and direct, not remote, uncertain, or 
speculative DeVore v IHC Hosps , 884 P2d 
1246 (Utah 1994) 
It was not error to deny a motion to vacate 
based on the arbitrator's failure to disclose his 
relationship with a nonparty, where there was 
no certain and direct evidence of an enduring 
relationship and the nonparty played an insig-
nificant and tangential role in the proceedings 
DeVore \ IHC Hosps , 884 P2d 1246 (Utah 
1994) 
— Refusal to hear ev idence . 
Where one party to an arbitration agreement 
requests one of three arbitrators for further 
time to present certain testimony and was 
assured by the arbitrator that he would be 
given an opportunity before the award was 
made to present such further evidence, which 
promise the arbitrator did not keep, and did not 
even convey the request to the other arbitra-
tors, such misbehavior came within the provi-
sions of former Subsection 78-31-16(3), which 
contained provisions similar to Subsection (b) 
of this section Giannopulos v Pappas, 80 Utah 
442 15 P2d 353 (1932) 
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—Statutory grounds exclusive. 
No other grounds for vacating or setting 
aside an award than those specified can be 
taken advantage of Giannopulos v PappaS, 80 
Utah 442, 15 P2d 353 (1932) (decided under 
similar provisions of former § 78-31-16) 
Time for filing motion. 
The procedural safeguards set out in §§ 78-
31a-13(l) and Subsection (2) of this section are 
designed to protect against arbitrary, unfair, or 
prejudicial treatment m the arbitration pro-
cess, however, failure to timely file a motion to 
either modify or vacate an award forecloses a 
comprehensive review on the merits of the 
arbitration process Allred v Educators Mut 
Ins Ass'n, 909 P2d 1263 (Utah 1996) 
—After judgment confirming award. 
The filing of motions to vacate or modify an 
award is barred once the court has entered a 
judgment confirming the award Robinson & 
Wells v Warren, 669 P2d 844 (Utah 1983) 
—Tolling provision. 
The reference in the tolling provision of Sub-
section (2) to 'corruption, fraud, and other 
undue means' encompasses arbitration impro-
prieties of which a party did not know and could 
not reasonably have known by the close of the 
proceeding or within twenty days after receiv-
ing a copy of the award Therefore, a motion 
under this section was timely when filed within 
twenty days after the movant received informa-
tion, nearly one year after the award, regarding 
possible bias of the arbitrator DeVore v IHC 
Hosps , 884 P2d 1246 (Utah 1994) 
Cited m Jeppsen v Piper, J affray k 
Hopwood, Inc, 879 F Supp 1130 (D Utah 
1995), Buzas Baseball, lnc v Salt Lak<> Trap 
pers, lnc, 925 P2d 941 (Utah 1996), Inter 
mountain Power Agency v Union Pac R R , 961 
P2d 320 (Utah 1998) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Case Lavv 
Developments Judicial Standards of Review 
Governing Appeals from Arbitration and the 
Relation Between the Federal and Utah Arbi-
tration Statutes, 1997 Utah L Rev 1096 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am Jur 2d Arbitration 
and Award §§ 167 to 189 
C.J.S. — 6 C J S Arbitration §§ 149 to 169 
A.L.R. — Refusal of arbitrators to receive 
evidence, or to permit briefs or arguments, on 
particular issues as grounds for relief from 
award, 75 A L R 3d 132 
Admissibility of affidavit or testimony of ar-
bitrator to impeach or explain award, 80 
ALR3d 155 
What constitutes corruption, fraud, or undue 
means m obtaining arbitration award justify-
ing avoidance of award under state law, 22 
A L R 4th 366 
Setting aside arbitration award on ground of 
interest or bias of arbitrators — insurance 
appraisals or arbitrations, 63 A L R 5th 675 
Setting aside arbitration award on ground of 
interest or bias of arbitrators — toits, 64 
A L R 5th 475 
Setting aside arbitration award on grcund of 
interest or bias of arbitrator — labor disputes, 
66 A L R 5th 611 
Setting aside arbitration award on ground of 
interest or bias of arbitrators — commercial, 
business, or real estate transactions, 67 
A L R 5th 179 
78-31 a-15. Modification of award by court [Repealed ef-
fective May 15, 2003]. 
(1) Upon motion made within 20 days after a copy of the award is served 
upon the moving party, the court shall modify or correct the award if it 
appears. 
(a) there was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake 
in the description of any person or property referred to in the award; 
(b) the arbitrators' award is based oi\ a matter not submitted to them, 
if the award can be corrected without affecting the merits of the award 
upon the issues submitted; or 
(c) the award is imperfect as to form. 
(2) If the motion is granted, the court shall modify and correct the award 
and confirm it as modified and corrected Otherwise, the court shall deny the 
motion and confirm the award of the arbitrators. 
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(3) A motion to modify or correct an award may be joined in the alternative 
with a motion to vacate the award 
History: C. 1953, 78-31 a-15, enacted by L. enacts a new Chapter 31a m its place, effective 
1985, ch.*225, * 1. * May 15,2003 
Repealed effective May 15. 2003. — Laws Cross-References. — Motions and orders 
2002, ch 326, § 33 repeals this chaptei and geneially, U R C P 6(b), 6(d), 6(e), 7(b), 43(b) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS no basis for the distnct court to modify the 
award under Subsection (1Kb) Softsolutions, 
Basis for modification
 l n c v Bngham Young Univ, 2000 UT 46,1 P 3d 
Cited
 1095 
Basis for modification. Cited in DeVore v IHC Hosps , 884 P 2d 1246 
Because the matter of loyalties fell \uthm (Utah 1994), Buzas Baseball, lnc v Salt Lake 
the issues submitted for arbitration, there was Trappers, lnc , 925 P2d 941 (Utah 1996) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Case Law tration Statutes, 1997 Utah L Rev 1096 
Developments Judicial Standards of Review Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am Jur 2d Arbitration 
Governing Appeals from Arbitration and the and Award § 143 
Relation Between the Federal and Utah Aibi C.J.S. — 6 C J S Arbitration §§ 160, 168 
78»31a-]6. Award as judgment [Repealed effective May 
15, 2003]. 
An award which is confirmed, modified, or corrected by the court shall be 
treated and enforced in all respects as a judgment Costs incurred incident to 
any motion authorized by this chapter, including a reasonable attorney's fee, 
unless precluded by the arbitration agreement, may be awarded by the court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-31 a-16, enacted by L. enacts a new Chapter 31a in its place, effective 
1985, ch. 225, * 1. May 15, 2003 
Repealed effective May 15, 2003. — Laws Cross-References. — Arbitration and 
2002, ch 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and award as affiimative defense, U R C P 8(c) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS and case law supported such an award 
Softsolutions lnc v Bngham Young Univ, 
Attorney fees
 2000 UT 46, 1 P3d 1095 
Cited 
Cited in Buzas Baseball, lnc v Salt Lake 
Attorney fees. Trappers lnc 925 P 2d 941 (Utah 1996), Inter-
Defendant was entitled to attorney s fees at a mountain Power Agency v Union Pac R R , 961 
rate it would have cost defendant to litigate the P2d 320 (Utah 1998), Pacific Dev, LC v 
matter with comparable outside counsel espe Orton, 1999 UT App 217, 982 P2d 94, Pacific 
cially when the contract, controlling statutes Dev, L C v Orton, 2001 UT 36, 23 P3d 1035 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Case Lav^  tration Statutes, 1997 Utah L Rev 1096 
Developments Judicial Standards of Review Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am Jur 2d Arbitration 
Governing Appeals from Aibitiation and the and Award § 166 
Relation Between the Federal and Utah Aibi C.J.S. — 6 C J S Aibitration § 124 
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A.L.R. — Awarding attorneys' fees m connec-
tion with arbitration, 60 A L R 5th 669 
78-31a-17. Motions [Repealed effective May 15, 2003]. 
(1) Notice of an initial motion for an order of arbitration shall be served as 
provided by law for the service of a summons, unless otherwise specified by the 
parties in the arbitration agreement. 
(2) A motion to the court or the arbitrators shall be made and heard as 
provided by law for motions in civil actions, except as otherwise specified in 
this chapter. 
(3) Notice in writing of the motion shall be served on the adverse party as 
provided by law for civil actions. 
History: C. 1953, 78-31 a-17, enacted by L. 2002, ch 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and 
1985, ch. 225, § 1. enacts a new Chapter 31a m its place, effective 
Repealed effective May 15, 2003. — Laws May 15, 2003 
78-31 a-18. Location for arbitration [Repealed effective 
May 15, 2003]. 
If an arbitration agreement provides that arbitration be held in a specified 
county, the district court of that county has jurisdiction to hear the initial 
motion for arbitration. If no provision is made, hearing on the initial motion for 
arbitration shall be before the district court of the county where the adverse 
party resides or has a place of business or, if the adverse party has no residence 
or place of business in this state, in the county in which the adverse party is 
served. Unless the court with jurisdiction otherwise orders, all subsequent 
motions or hearings incident to the arbitration proceeding shall be heard by 
the court hearing the initial motion. 
History: C. 1953, 78-31 a-18, enacted by L. 2002, ch 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and 
1985, ch. 225, § 1. enacts a new Chapter 31a in its place, effective 
Repealed effective May 15, 2003. — Laws May 15, 2003 
78-31a-19. Appeals [Repealed effective May 15, 2003]. 
An appeal may be taken by any aggrieved party as provided by law for 
appeals in civil actions from any court order: 
(1) denying a motion to compel arbitration; 
(2) granting a motion to stay arbitration; 
(3) confirming or denying confirmation of an arbitration award; 
(4) modifying or correcting an award; or 
(5) vacating an award without directing rearbitration. 
History; C . ^ ^ l f e - S l a - l S , enacted \>y\.. 2002, ch 326, % %% -repeals th\s chapter KSA 
1985, ch. 225, § 1. enacts a new Chapter 31a in its place, effective 
Repealed effective May 15, 2003. — Laws May 15, 2003 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability of section 
Vacation without directing rearbitration 
Cited 
Applicability of sec t ion . 
This section is procedural and would there-
fore apply to an action in which the complaint 
was filed befoie the effective date of the section 
but the appeal was filed after such date 
Docutel Olivetti Corp \ Dick Brady Sys , 733 
P2d 475 (Utah 1986) 
A party mav seek review of any order denying 
a motion to compel aibitration, regardless of 
whether the order is a final judgment or has 
otherwise been designated as final by the dis-
trict court under U R C P 54(b) Pledger v 
Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, 982 R2d 572 
Vacation wi thout direct ing rearbitration. 
Order of court in arbitration case, setting 
aside award and ordering new hearing without 
order for resubmission but also affirmatively 
ordering plaintiffs and interveners to present 
their claims for damages to receiver of defen-
dant coiporation, was final and appealable or-
der Bivans v Utah Lake Land, Water & Power 
Co , 53 Utah 601, 174 P 1126 (1918) 
Cited m Chandler v Blue Cross Blue Shield, 
833 P2d 356 (Utah 1992), Miller v USAA Cas 
Ins Co , 2002 UT 6, 438 P3d 31 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am Jur 2d Arbitration 
and Award §§ 82, 145 
C.J.S. — 6 C J S Arbitration §§ 161 to 163 
A.L.R. — Appealability of state court's order 
or decree compelling or refusing to compel 
arbitration 6 A L R 4th 652 
Uninsured and undei insured motorist cover 
age enforceability of policy provision limiting 
appeals from arbitration, 23 A L R 5th 801 
Appealability of order staying or refusing to 
stay, proceedings in federal district court pend-
ing arbitration proceedings, 11A L R Fed 640 
Appealability of federal court order granting 
or denying stay of arbitration, 31 A L R Fed 
234 
78-31a-20. Scope of chapter [Repealed effective May 15, 
2003]. 
This chapter is not intended to provide a means of arbitration exclusive of 
those sanctioned under common law. 
History: C. 1953, 78-31 a-20, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 225, § 1. 
Repealed effective May 15, 2003. — Laws 
2002, ch 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and 
enacts a new Chapter 31a in its place, effective 
May 15, 2003 
CHAPTER 31a 
UTAH UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT 
[EFFECTIVE MAY 15, 2003] 
Section 
78-31a-101 
78-31a-102 
78-31a-103 
78-31a-104 
78-31a-105 
78-31a 106 
Title [Effective May 15, 2003] 
Definitions [Effective May 15, 
2003] 
Notice [Effective May 15, 2003] 
Application [Effective May 15 
2003] 
Effect of agreement to arbitrate 
— Nonwaivable provisions 
[Effective May 15, 2003] 
Application for judicial relief 
[Effective May 15, 2003] 
Section 
78-31a 107 
78-3 la-108 
78-31a-109 
78-3U-110 
78-31a-l l l 
Validity of agreement to arbi-
trate [Effective May 15, 
2003] 
Motion to compel arbitration 
[Effective May 15, 2003] 
Provisional remedies [Effective 
May 15, 2003] 
Initiation of arbitration [Effec-
tive May 15, 2003] 
Consolidation of separate arbi-
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ADDENDUM C 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 
Article 1: Agreement to Arbitrate: We hereby agree to submit to binding arbitration all disputes and claims for damages of 
iy kind for injuries and losses arising from the medical care rendered or which should have been rendered after the date of this 
greement. All claims for monetary damages against the physician, and the physician's partners, associates, association, corporation 
partnership, and the employees, agents and estaies of any of them (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Physician"), must be 
bitratcd including, without limitation, claims for personal injury, loss of consortium, wrongful death, emotional distress or punitive 
images. We agree that the Physician may pursue a legal action to collect any fee from the patient and doing so shall not waive the 
iysician'5 right to compel arbitration of any malpractice claim. However, following the assertion of any malpractice claim against 
e Physician, any fee dispute, whether or not the subject of any existing legal action, shall also be resolved by arbitration. 
We expressly intend that this Agreement shall bind all persons whose claims for injuries and losses arise out of medical care 
ndered or which should have been rendered by Physician after the date of this Agreement, including any spouse or heirs of the 
itient and any children, whether born or unborn at the rime of the occurrence giving rise to any claim (hereinafter collectively 
ferred to as k:PatientM) 
Article 2: Waiver of Right of Trial: We expressly waive all rights to pursue any legal action to seek damages or any other 
raedies in a court of law, including the right to a jury or court trial, except to enforce our decision to arbitrate, to collect any 
bitration award and to facilitate the arbitration process as permitted by the Utah Arbitration Act. 
Article 3: Procedures and Appointment of Arbitrators: Patient shall serve Physician by certified mail with a written 
:mand for arbitration which shall specify the nature of the claim, the date of the claimed occurrence, the complained of conduct by 
e Physician, and a description of the Patients' injuries and damages. Within 60 days after the demand, the parties shall agree upon a 
:utral arbitrator to be selected from a list of individuals approved as arbitrators by the State or Federal courts of Utah. If the parties 
mnot agree upon a neutral arbitrator, the court shall select an individual from that list. The neutral arbitrator shall: preside over the 
bitration hearing and pre-arbitrarion conferences; establish scheduling orders; supervise the conduct of discovery to prevent abuse 
id insure efficiency and cost-effectiveness; rule on all motions, including motions for summary judgment and motions to dismiss for 
ilure to proceed with reasonable diligence; administer oaths; issue subpoenas; and exercise other powers granted to arbitrators in the 
tah Arbitration Act. Within six months of the demand for arbitration or as otherwise ordered by the neutral arbitrator, Patient shall 
lect one arbitrator and Physician shall select one arbitrator. Patient and Physician shall pay the fees and expenses of his or her own 
bitiator Each party shall share equally the expenses and fees of the neutral arbitrator. The parties agree that the arbitrators have the 
ununity of a judicial officer from civil liability when acting in the capacity of an arbitrator under this Agreement. 
Ail claims based on the same occurrence, incident, or care shall be arbitrated in one proceeding: however, Patient or 
lysician shall have the absolute right to arbitrate separately issues of liability and damage upon written request to the neutral 
bitrator. Arbitration hearings will be held in the County of the Physician's principal place of business or elsewhere as the parries 
ay agTee. 
The parties consent to the participation in this arbitration of any person or entity that would otherwise be a proper additional 
irty in a court action and which agrees to be bound by the arbitration decision. Any existing court action against such additional 
Tson or entity shall be stayed upon agreement to participate in the arbitration. 
The parries agree that the arbitration proceedings are private, not public, and the privacy of the parties and of the arbitration 
oceedings shall be preserved. 
Article 4: Applicable Law; Widi respect to any matter not herein expressly provided for, the arbitration shall be governed 
f the Utah Arbitration Act. All provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, with the exception of the notice of intent and 
e-litigation hearing requirements which the parties hereby waive, shall apply to the arbitration. The comparative fault provisions of 
tah law apply to the arbitration and tie arbitrators shall apportion fault to all persons or entities who contributed to the claimed injury 
hether or not they are panics to the arbitration. 
Article 5: Revocation: This Agreement may be revoked by written notice mailed to the Physician, by certified mail, within 
) days after signature, and if not revoked shall govern all medical services received by the Patient after the date of this Agreement. 
Article 6: Term: the term of this Agreement is one year from the date it is signed. It shall be automatically renewed from 
:ar to year thereafter unless either party to this Agreement notifies the other of his or her election not to renew in writing delivered by 
rtified mail prior to the renewal date. 
Article 7: Read and Understood: I (Patient or Patient's representative) have read and I understand the above Agreement. I 
iderstand that I have the right to have my questions about arbitration answered and 1 do not have any unanswered questions. I 
ecute this agreement of my own free will and not under any duress, and I understand that I my signing this agreement is not a 
quirement in order to receive medical services from Physician. 
Article 8: Received Copy: I have received a copy of this document. 
Article 9: Severability: If any provision of this Agreement is held invalid or unenforceable, the remaining provisions shall 
main in full force and shall not be affected by the invalidity of any other provision. 
